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1. INTRODUCTION
If I am not for myself, who will be for me?
And if I am only for myself, what am I?
And if not now, when?
Pirqe Avot, 1:14.
1 Introduction
From the economic point of view, marriage is a long-run contract which com-
mands monogamy and couple-specific investments that are expected to increase
the value of the union across time. When legal norms forbid divorce, the accu-
mulation of marital human capital does not need to account for default risk. By
contrast, when unilateral divorce is permitted, married individuals run the risk
of the partner walking away. Should this occur, most couple-specific investments
cannot be used without large switching costs over the next marriage. A common
way to cover from such costs is to search harder and longer for matches which
are less likely to dissolve. Thus, if legal norms make marriage a risky contract,
rational agents should be very careful about the quality of their matching. Nev-
ertheless, no-fault divorce also provides the opportunity to break unilaterally an
unhappy marriage: this action prevents the risk of spending one’s life in distress
and gloominess. By allowing for this exit option, the same rational agents may
become less cautious when considering a marriageable mate and then could de-
cide to stop their search at an earlier age. Whether age at marriage decreases
or increases in response to the introduction of divorce is a matter of empirical
investigation.
It is a controversial issue whether divorce laws change incentives to marry.
Until now, economic debate on the effects of divorce law has focused mainly on
changes from consensual to no-fault divorce legislation using aggregate state-
level data for the US. The stream of literature which relates to Becker’s applica-
tion of Coase’s theorem to family organization (Gray, 1998; Peters, 1992, 1986)
maintains that marital bargaining can offset legal innovations, while opponents
(Friedberg, 1998; Allen, 1992) find that changes in legislation have a significant
impact on divorce rates. Most recent approaches (Wolfers, 2006) find that the im-
pact on divorce rates is only temporary, while in the long run the Coase theorem
holds for married couples. The alternative approach based on collective models
(Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002) has long stressed the role played by divorce
laws in shifting bargaining positions within marriage. Recently, Allen, Pendakur,
and Suen (2006) have estimated the effect on the age at marriage of a change from
consensual to no-fault divorce legislation, controlling for state heterogeneity and
time trends: results show a slight increase in the mean age at marriage and a
5% increase in its standard deviation for subjects living in states which adopted
no-fault divorce. Basically, all previous literature is aimed at identifying the ef-
fects of changes in existing divorce legislation, not the effect of ex novo divorce
legislation.
This paper studies the effect on the age at marriage of the introduction of divorce
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law in a social scenario in which marriage is not rescindable using a microeconomic
model of optimal sequential search (Bougheas and Georgellis, 1999; Matsushita,
1989). The model is then estimated over a dataset of retrospective individual
histories, using observations before and after the reform. In our view, the pro-
cess of mutual search is lengthy, costly, and deeply interrelated with other crucial
decisions in one’s life, such as the educational path or participation in the labor
market. These dimensions are relevant since improving and refining personal
traits – such as educational attainment, physical appearance, financial robustness
– may increase the probability of finding and matching with better partners. Yet
these actions are usually time-intensive and can be combined with marriage only
at a substantial cost. This shows the emergence of a trade-off between the prob-
ability of marriage and its timing, arising from strategic actions that boost one’s
competitive position in the marriage market, which in turn contribute to post-
pone the event of marriage itself. In this context of dynamic action, the notions
of investment irreversibility and value of waiting (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) play
a key role. We test whether after the legal reform introducing divorce, marriage
has become a less irreversible investment. If so, the option value of waiting for
a better match should register a drop, resulting in shorter search spells for the
representative agent. Moreover, the introduction of divorce has possibly affected
the probability of marriage indirectly as well, through changes in choice variables
like education and job status, provided that participants in the marriage market
attach value to specific personal traits.
In the econometric section, two specifications, one parametric and another
semiparametric, were estimated for the age at marriage on a panel of 5,814 Italian
subjects. The legal regime change is modeled through a Before-After estimator
(Lee, 2005; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999): taking account of time trends
and personal characteristics including education, job status, religious attendance,
and family background, we find that divorce has strongly contributed to shorten
the average search spell, mainly for women, possibly reinforcing self-fulfilling
prophecies of divorce. Most likely, this differential result for gender specification
depends upon the binding biological constraint that women have on fertility. Ed-
ucational choices seem little influenced by divorce, both for women and men; on
the contrary, the same law lowered women’s propensity to gain more stable jobs,
while increasing the role played by men’s occupational status in determining age
at marriage. Also, an educational level higher than similar individuals adversely
affects the probability of marriage, but this peer effect is stronger for men. After
divorce was passed, religiously committed people modified their search behav-
ior: women shortened their search spells, while no significant effect is reported
for men. Above all, the strongest effect of divorce reform appears to be a large
decline in the value of marital search, a result which confirms the irreversibility
hypothesis and the underlying theoretical model.
With regard to background literature (Allen, Pendakur, and Suen, 2006), this
work has three main innovative features. First, it takes advantage of a multivari-
ate panel structure which allows for observation of relevant age-related predic-
tors. Second, the effect of the very event of divorce introduction is tested and
found significant at explaining age at marriage: this very rarely appears in sur-
veys on the same issue, since divorce was introduced in the US long before panel
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studies were started. Third, it is found that subjects under study behaved accord-
ing to the standard predictions of option value theory.
The article proceeds as follows: the second section surveys basic facts about
marriage in Italy and presents evidence of aggregate trends; the third section
builds the dynamic model of marriage and divorce under the assumption of no-
fault divorce; the fourth describes the details of variables included in the empir-
ical model; the fifth discusses results from estimation; the sixth provides final
comments and further developments.
2 Some Stylized Facts
A preliminary outlook at the data1 from an aggregate point of view displays some
major trends occurring in the Italian marriage market between 1950 and 2001.
During the period under scrutiny two main legal innovations in marriage law
took place. On 1st December 1970, following an ongoing European trend, the
Italian Parliament passed a law permitting unilateral divorce: while marital sep-
aration was already legally allowed, under the new regime, for the first time in
Italian history, spouses were allowed to untie the marriage contract and possibly
remarry after five years of legal separation. Four years later, a public consultation
promoted by traditional Catholics and Conservatives for the abolition of the new
law saw the anti-divorce coalition soundly defeated. This event testified to the
changing view of marriage spreading through Italian society and an increasingly
strong preference for more liberal customs. Finally, the five-years waiting time
between separation and divorce was shortened to three years by a minor reform
in 1987.
Over the years under study (1950–2001), the nuptiality rate (the total number
of marriages, in a given year, divided by the total population between 16 and 49
years old), plotted in fig. 1, decreased from 14% to 10% .2 In the same period,
mean age at marriage increased for men from 28.9 to 31.26, whereas for women it
recorded a striking increase from 24.97 to 28.49, as can be seen in fig. 2. Both
graphs show two different temporal patterns for the two time series. Nuptial-
ity rate shows a fairly steady downward trend starting shortly after 1960, with
temporary reversal around 1971 and 1987: since the total number of marriages
also includes second and subsequent marriages, the increased ratio accounts for
those who were waiting to divorce and remarry. The graph of mean age at mar-
riage does not show a similar neat trend; rather, it suggests a u-shaped curve with
its lower bound around the period 1970–1980 and a steady increase until recent
years. Whether or not the 1970 divorce reform played a role in determining age
at marriage, its outcome was an increased variability of age at marriage, whereas
the minor reform of 1987 does not seem not to affect the upward trend of the same
variable.
The numbers for divorce and separation display the most striking evidence
1Evidence provided in this section and in the graphs section is taken from ISTAT (Italian Sta-
tistical Institute) and represent the whole statistical universe.
2The United States experienced a decrease from 11.1% to 8.4% , the French crude marriage
rate fell from 7.9% to 4.9% , the German rate from 10.0% to 4.7% .
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for changing behavior of Italian couples, as shown in fig. 3. In 1950, the separation
rate (the ratio between legal separations and new marriages in a given year) was
1.5%, while in 2001 the same ratio rocketed to 29.1%. During the period 1971–
2001, the divorce rate (the ratio between total divorces and new marriages in a
given year) jumped from 4.2% to 16.7%.3
As a rule of thumb, the ratio between separations and marriages can be con-
sidered an initial indicator of marital risk at an aggregate level. All caveats pro-
vided, it can be affirmed that, without other a priori information, marriage is
steadily becoming a riskier business. On the one hand, the observer could be
tempted to establish a simple relationship between the increasing level of marital
risk and the increasing age at marriage: since marriage is a long-run contract that
calls for specific investments, an increase in the average level of risk could be at
least partially offset by an increase in the quality of marriage, and then in the time
spent in the search for a partner. However, this does not seem the case for Italy,
given the rise in separation and divorce which occurred during the same period.
On the other hand, a well-established empirical correlation in the literature on
marriage breakup states that a higher age at marriage decreases the likelihood
of divorce. Marriage surprises (Weiss and Willis, 1997), driven by financial and
preference shocks that make marriage relationships unstable, are more likely to
happen when spouses are young. However, aggregate Italian data show that age
at marriage and marital risk both registered a steady increase. This apparent con-
tradiction might be explained if we assume that divorce follows an exogenous
temporal path and age at marriage tries to catch up with it. In other words, peo-
ple may try to compensate for the higher levels of riskiness by being increasingly
selective in their search process. Alternatively, people could compensate the in-
creased level of marital risk by being more prone to separation and divorce, there-
fore investing less in marital capital and then reinforcing self-fulfilling prophecies
of divorce.
Matching choices are mainly influenced by educational choices, since school-
ing and university attendance can be combined with marital life, pregnancies,
and child rearing only at a substantial cost. This is not to say that highly edu-
cated women are less likely to marry, just the opposite could be true. Investment
in education is strategic not only in the labor market: as marriage becomes in-
creasingly based on cooperation rather than traditional gender roles, more edu-
cation can result in better matches. A striking trend of the increasing education
of women is depicted in fig. 4, where the ratio of female to male university grad-
uated is considered since it encompasses all completed levels of schooling. It was
only 45.9% in 1950, while it almost completely reversed to 130.2% in 2001; the
increasing trend was temporarily halted during the years 1970–1987, the same
years in which the age at marriage appears almost stationary.
To sum up, in the period under study, nuptiality decreased steadily, while age
at marriage rose, mainly due to higher levels of education; indicators of marital
disruption reveal increasing risk in marriage, while women seem increasingly
involved in higher education, compared to men. In the empirical section of the
3A caveat must be provided: the ratio between separations and divorces over marriages in the
same year does not take into account the lag from marriage to its breakup, i.e. the effect of mean
duration of marriage.
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paper, some of these trends are included in the regression model to evaluate the
differential effect of the divorce law, holding other variables constant.
3 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical model used to explain the decision to marry is built around the
assumption that the search process for a partner is costly and time-consuming.
We explicitly endorse a search-theoretic structure resembling the one provided in
Filoso (2005), albeit slightly simplified.
In this stylized framework, all agents live infinite lives and in each period
receive a marriage proposal from an agent of the opposite sex. The payoff from
marriage depends on the quality of the match and on the legal context concerning
the divorce law. The quality of the marriage proposal is the random variable
m, with m ∈ [0, ∞), cumulated probability function F(m), and density function
f (m). Once a random meeting has occurred, both partners observe the quality
of the match and privately decide whether to accept the current offer; if both
partners agree, then marriage takes place. The utility function is u(mt) = mt for
all agents. Unmarried agents at time t have mt = 0. The optimization program is:
max E
(
∞
∑
t=0
δtu(mt))
)
where δ is the intertemporal discount factor.
The legal scenario impacts the temporal structure of payoffs from marriage.
If law forbids divorce, then agents realize that their choice is not reversible and
all the forgone future offers are lost forever once a given partner is accepted; oth-
erwise, if the law permits divorce – in particular, unilateral divorce – then agents
can leave a mate for a better one, but at the same time they run the risk of being
dropped by their current partner. In other words, divorce involves a change both
in prospective costs and benefits from a legal marriage contract.
When divorce is not allowed by law, the choice problem for a prospective
bride or groom is summarized in the following Bellman equation, in which the
control variable is the binary choice taken over acceptance or rejection:
V (m) = max
A,R
{
m
1− δ , c + δ
∫
V(m′)dF(m′)
}
; (1)
the left argument in the max function is the discounted value of marrying with
the current proposer and receiving m from the next period onward, while the
right argument accounts for c, which is the net benefit from remaining single
for a period plus
∫
V(m′)dF(m′), a term which represents the expected value of
continuing search for a better partner. This equation has the reservation value
property (Lippman and McCall, 1976): a unique threshold level m∗ is identifiable
from equation (1) and is used by agents to reject all proposals whose value is
lower than m∗ and accept the first proposal whose value is equal or greater than
m∗. In general, a closed form for m∗ can be extracted only in very special cases
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for F (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1986); however, a quasi-closed form for m can be
shown (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000) to be equal to
m∗ − c = δ
1− δ
∫ ∞
m∗
(
m′ −m∗) dF(m′). (2)
When unilateral divorce is allowed, from the beginning of the search process
agents must take into account that, once married, the partner can walk away: in
this case, the payoff from the current marriage proposal is stochastic and depends
on the probability γ that the other partner leaves the current marriage (Stokey,
Lucas, and Prescott, 1989, p. 305). Hence, the optimization problem must be split
into two stages: in the first, an agent decides whether or not to get married; in
the second, the same agent decides whether to stay married or divorce and look
for the next available partner. Starting from the second stage and solving back-
wards gets the solution to the whole problem (Mortensen, 1986, p. 871). It is a
well known result in stationary search theory (Burdett and Mortensen, 1978) that
agents never choose to exercise the option to drop a match once married, so we
must assume a further structure to allow for divorce. We make the assumption
that agents keep sampling from the same distribution F while married, although
at a lower pace φ, and divorce only if the utility they get from remaining married
falls behind the utility deriving from searching for a new partner. The Bellman
equation for a married agent is
VM (m) = max
R,D
{
m + δ
[
(1− γ)VM(m) + γVU(m′)
]
, c− d + φδVM(m′)
}
(3)
where VM(m) is the value function for the choice problem of a married agent and
possible actions are remaining married or divorcing. The left argument within
the max function represents the payoff from remaining married for a period: the
agent enjoys m, but faces a probability γ of being dropped during the next period.
Accounting for this uncertainty requires writing the expected value of the next
period’s payoff: if the other mate decides to remain married, the expected payoff
from marriage will be (1− γ)VM(m), while if the other mate decides to divorce,
the expected payoff from that scenario is γVU(m′), where VU(m′) is the value
function for the choice problem of an unmarried agent, to be described later on.
On the right side of the max function we find the value from divorce: in this
case, the agent must bear the opportunity cost of divorce d net of any payoff from
singlehood c; after a period, the agent goes back to the marriage market and starts
his/her search again.
Turning to the first stage of the search process, we find that the choice problem
for an unmarried agent who looks for a partner is
VU (m) = max
A,R
{
VM(m), c + δ
∫
VU(m′)dF(m′)
}
(4)
As in equation (1), the left-hand argument in the Bellman equation is the value
from marriage, as described in (3), while the right-hand argument represents the
expected value from continued search. Plugging equation (3) into (4) provides a
full description of the dynamic choice problem arising from a legal framework in
which unilateral divorce is permitted.
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Previous discussion was aimed at obtaining reservation levels for marriage
quality, but these values can rarely be observed by the social scientist, so the
solution must be reformulated in order to obtain a structure that resembles actual
behavior. Usually, quality of marriage cannot be observed but age at marriage
can. The probability of leaving singlehood conditional upon past unsuccessful
search – the hazard function – is (Devine and Kiefer, 1991):
θ = λ
∫ ∞
m∗
f (m)dm = λ[1− F(m∗)] (5)
where λ is the rate at which marriage offers arrive in the time unit. Finally, the
singlehood duration density is given by
h = θ exp
{
−
∫ ∞
m∗
θ(m)dm
}
. (6)
3.1 Individual-level Predictors
To allow for an empirically implementable framework, we must introduce enough
structure in the search problem. In particular, two issues in modeling age at mar-
riage need to be addressed: time dependence and individual heterogeneity, both
of these inducing nonstationarity in the reservation quality of marriage.
Time dependence of age at marriage may arise from three main sources: (a) fi-
nite horizon optimization, (b) changing marriage market conditions, and (c) bio-
logical constraints. First, the actual time horizon for human agents is not infinite:
if special motives are not at hand to model the search process using an infinite
horizon, the finite horizon should be used instead. Secondly, marriage market
externalities (Cornelius, 2003; Burdett and Coles, 1999, 1997) and age preference
create time dependence too: as time passes, an increasing fraction of the pool of
marriageable mates gets married, so an agent finds marital matching increasingly
difficult. The probability of a match decreases over time as the marriage market
shrinks because of the shrinking time horizon over which marriage produces its
benefits. Time dependence may also arise because of differential fecundity: bi-
ologically, women are more constrained than men as their fertile section of life-
time is shorter than men’s. Given that all of these considerations impact on the
reservation quality of marriage, introducing time-dependence equation (5) can be
rewritten as
θ(t) = λ[1− F(m∗(t))].
Also, different individual characteristics actually impact age at marriage: some
of them are time-invariant, such as sex and family background, while others
are time-varying, such as the level of education and job status. Furthermore,
some variables do not strictly depend on individual choice: marriage market
conditions, demographic transitions, and geographical accessibility are taken as
environmental variables affecting the probability of marriage. We group these
individual-level and environmental characteristics in the vector Xi,t so that the
duration of singlehood can account for this source of individually observed het-
erogeneity (Lancaster, 1990):
h (Xi,t, t) = ψ(t) exp
{
X′i,tβ
}
. (7)
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With this formulation, which is common in the literature on duration data, the
hazard rate is modeled as the product of the baseline hazard ψ(t) shared by all
agents times an exponential term depending on the set of observable covariates
and on the vector β of estimated parameters. Strictly speaking, previous discus-
sion applies to the model as expressed in equation (1), but given that a formal
analytical derivation of the model allowing for unilateral divorce is extremely
difficult to analyze (van den Berg, 1990, p. 261), we leave modeling of divorce to
the empirical specification to be estimated.
4 Description of Variables
The vector Xi,t includes variables affecting the decision to marry. These may be
partitioned into two main categories: (a) those which are – at least partially –
decided by the agent, such as educational attainment, job participation, religious
attendance, and (b) those which are not chosen, like family background. Whereas
variables in category (b) are chosen in advance by other agents and then typi-
cally time-invariant, variables in (a) are usually time-varying. A residual variable
which varies across time but not depend on individual choices is the introduc-
tion of divorce law. In what follows it is assumed that women and men show
systematically different search behavior, because fertility periods differ for sexes
(Siow, 1998) and women are more biologically constrained than men (Landsburg,
2000); also, the graphical assessment of hazard ratios in figs. (5) and (6) dis-
play marked differences between sexes, with women marrying at an earlier age
than men. Given these considerations, regressions were estimated separately for
women and men, in order to clearly evaluate the interaction of different covari-
ates with gender.
Divorce Law
Potentially, a change in divorce legislation can impact on the age at marriage or,
equivalently, the probability of transition from singlehood to marriage, both by
directly changing the option value of waiting for a better marriage opportunity
and indirectly changing the choice variables that influence age at marriage, like
education or job status. When examining the role played by legal innovation in
directly modifying the age at marriage, the interest is in the following difference:
∆ = E
[
hADi,t − hBDi,t
]
= E
[
hADi,t |After Divorce
]
− E
[
hBDi,t |Before Divorce
]
(8)
where hADi,t is the mean age at marriage of an agent living in an environment at
time t in which divorce is permitted and hBDi,t is the mean age at marriage of the
same agent at time t where divorce is forbidden. Since the previous difference
cannot be estimated because the two values are never observed simultaneously
for the same agent, the counterfactual observation is constructed taking advan-
tage of the panel structure of the dataset. At first, a dummy variable was created
with its value set at zero for observations of individuals at risk and not married
until divorce reform and its value set at one for all other observations afterwards.
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The dummy variable then partitions individuals into three samples: (a) those
who got married before the reform, (b) those who entered the marriage market
before the reform and experienced the change during marital search, and (c) those
who entered the marriage market after the reform was passed. This partition pro-
vides an opportunity to use the Before-After (BA) estimator (Heckman, LaLonde,
and Smith, 1999), assuming that agents from sample (a) and (c) are intrinsically
identical with respect to their preferences and constraints, once we control for
observable covariates in Xi,t. Consequently, the remaining difference in the age at
marriage is attributable to the divorce law and to the interaction of the dummy
with other covariates. To estimate such a model, Lee (2005, pp. 30-32) proposes
the following linear specification:
log (hi,t) = X′i,tβ + di,tX
′
i,tζ + di,tχ + υi,t (9)
where β is the coefficient vector for explaining variables, ζ is the coefficient vector
for the explaining variables interacting with the dummy variable of the divorce
law, χ is the coefficient for the same dummy variable, and υ is an error term
whose structure also depends on the dummy variable. The value of χ captures
any structural break occurring after the divorce law comes into force, while a
comparison between β and ζ reveals whether the explaining variables changed
their impact after the divorce law. Since the theory of marital search provides no
straightforward hint on error specification, the issue is solved empirically in the
estimation section. To account for any time trend occurring in the period under
study which may confound the effect of the divorce law, the year of observation
is inserted as a control in itself and also multiplied by the dummy.
Education
In marriage markets, like in other markets, rational agents tend to differentiate
their own offer. In order to obtain extra benefits from the matching mechanism,
people tend to escape the sluggishness of uniformity and signal themselves as ex-
traordinary individuals. On the one hand, some signals can be deceitful: Match-
ing theory has long demonstrated (Roth, 1984; Bergstrom and Manning, 1982)
that in every matching game agents tend to exaggerate their characteristics to
climb the ladder of matching quality. On the other hand, some assets reveal real
qualities that do make a big difference, and education is one of them. However,
since education cannot be easily combined with marital life and child rearing,
more educated individuals are expected to delay marriage until the process of
acquiring an education is completed. When traditional gender roles prevail, then
education should delay marriage more for women than for men. Higher levels
of education may lead to a more productive search which would have an am-
biguous effect on the duration of the search since direct search costs would be
lowered, but the number of searches possible per unit time would be increased
(Keeley, 1977). Nonetheless, more educated individuals may become more picky
and selective: even in this case, the net impact of education is controversial and
needs to be estimated.
As mentioned above, one problem we faced when assessing the impact of ed-
ucation on marriage is that education shows an increasing trend across time, and
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so it is a source of high and spurious correlation with the dummy for divorce
law. To deal with this difficulty, the following strategy was used: first the aver-
age level of education is estimated, with this average taken across sex, age, and
geographical location (North or South). Then this value is used to calculate the
percent difference between the actual individual level of completed education in
years and the appropriate average in the following way:
Differential Education =
ei,t(h, η, σ)− e¯t(h, η, σ)
e¯t(h, η, σ)
where h stands for age, η stands for geographical location, and σ stands for sex.
The term differential education emphasizes only a measure of difference and not the
whole stock of human capital itself. We used this variable instead of completed
education in the regressions in order to dispel the pure effect of education net of
any temporal exogenous increase in the same variable.
Do rational agents adjust their educational choices when divorce becomes an
option? When married couples split, a higher level of education may help both
partners find a better job and recover quicker from the financial losses from di-
vorce. This hypothesis should prove correct especially for women, since they can
compensate a weaker job status with stronger education to a greater extent than
men. Whether differential education also impacts on age at marriage after the
reform is an interesting point. Divorce law could make marriage markets more
competitive since rents for bilateral monopoly are lowered by the exit option. The
increased level of competition may drive agents to invest more in education to
catch up with the best competitors. However, this results in an increase in the av-
erage level of education, and agents with education above average become fewer.
Across time, the distribution of education becomes more concentrated around the
mean. Then, if preferences remain constant, the premium for differential educa-
tion should become greater.
Occupational Status
The choice whether to work at the market wage plays an important role in the
decision to marry (Burgess, Propper, and Aassve, 2003; Weiss, 1997; Bergstrom
and Schoeni, 1996), since the formation of a stable couple usually implies start-
up costs for a new apartment and all the utilities and furniture needed to make it
function. Whenever gender roles prevail, only one side of the couple is expected
to bear these costs for the most part. Furthermore, in the same traditional frame-
work, if men are expected to work in the market and women are expected to
work in the house, a stable job for men may impact positively on the likelihood
of marriage, whereas women’s likelihood of marriage should be unaffected by
their own job status, or it can be worsened. Obviously, as women become more
involved in higher education and consequently develop a higher propensity to
work outside the household, the marriage market adjusts to the new situation.
An increasingly egalitarian pattern of marriage due to a change in custom may
lead to a substantial change in the role played by occupational status for women.
To account for labor supply choices, the variable job status was coded in the fol-
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lowing way: 0 for unemployed, 1 for occasional job, 2 for seasonal job, and 3 for
stable job.
Interaction of divorce with job status also raises issues which parallel those
raised by education. Though, since job status is directly related to income pro-
duction, after divorce reform, its role in determining age at marriage could also be
strengthened. A better job position creates incentives to matching for men since
a stable job becomes more valuable when marriage duration becomes uncertain.
Given that a stable job also functions as an insurance for the hard times which
can follow from divorce (Lundberg and Pollak, 2003), women’s age at marriage
should decrease as women participate more in the job market and obtain stable
status.
Religious Attendance
Along with its economic, financial, and social facets, marriage also has strong
religious importance. Almost any religion entails some form of celebration for
marriage which attaches additional commitment to marital promises. For reli-
gious people, this results in higher levels of marriage-specific investments and
additional difficulties related to divorce. The current literature on marriage be-
havior of Catholics in the US (Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993; Chiswick and Lehrer,
1990) suggests that these people tend to marry later, with a larger fraction than
average remaining permanently single. Most probably, this depends on the per-
ceived level of irreversibility of marriage, enforced by religious stigma. Since the
mere declaration of Catholic identity could be misleading in a country like Italy
where Catholicism is widely predominant, the variable used to control for reli-
gious activity is yearly participation in religious ceremonies. This variable has
seven time-invariant modalities, ranging from 0 (no participation in a year) to 7
(more than once a week). The variable also interacts the dummy for the introduc-
tion of divorce to test how catholics reacted to this crucial innovation in national
legislation. It must be borne in mind that Catholic Church does not forbid di-
vorce per se, but only remarriage for divorcees: those who remarry against the
religious norm are not allowed to access the sacraments.
Family Background
To control for family background is important because young people rarely leave
the family home before getting married and usually retain strong links with their
family roots (Brien and Lillard, 1994; Michael and Tuma, 1985) and young Ital-
ians behave accordingly. Five control variables were considered: (1) years of
completed father’s education, (2) years of mother’s completed education, (3) a
dummy variable registering whether each individual’s parents owned their own
house, (4) the number of people present in the parents’ house when the individual
was fourteen, and (5) a dummy variable registering whether the subject is an only
child. In principle, parents with a strong economic situation can induce their off-
spring not to marry early, trading their resources against longer single spells. We
should expect parents’ educational attainments to adversely affect the likelihood
of marriage since education generally entails higher incomes and more liberal at-
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titudes toward marriage. Regarding family size, it is likely that in large families
parents usually cannot trade wealth against a longer stay in the house for their
offspring, so its expected impact on the likelihood of marriage should be positive.
The problem with including the previous four variables in equation (9) is the high
level of collinearity they show. To prevent instability in the estimates, a standard
Principal-Component analysis was used to compact the overall variability and
results are displayed in tab. (4). The resulting first factor, which summarizes the
effect of family background, was included in the model to be estimated.
5 Econometric Results
5.1 Sample and Estimation Procedure
The data used are taken from the Longitudinal Survey of Italian Families (ILFI)
which is a retrospective survey recording information on current and past events
of individual and family life.4 The first survey was held in 1997 and subse-
quent ones were held every two year. The dataset contains a complete account
of episodes of lives of individuals, ranging from education to marriage, and from
geographical mobility to labor experience; with this episode structure, it is possi-
ble to obtain an exact snapshot of the situation of an individual in a given moment
and study it using event-history methodology.
To take into account systematic differences between sexes and in order to em-
phasize them clearly, each regression was run separately for women and men.
Three types of observations were excluded from the sample: (1) all subjects who
married prior to 1950, since marital behavior during war time can be erratic due
to exceptional circumstances impacting matching possibilities, education, and
work; (2) observations prior to the age of 18, because marriage for individuals
who are under age is subject to particular legal restrictions; (3) observations for
people who do not marry before the 49th year of their life: this exclusion is due to
the biological constraint on fertility, since late marriages presumably follow from
alternative lifestyles which do not include children rearing. As a result of this se-
lection, in all, the complete sample models contains 29,888 observations covering
2,664 men plus 26,046 observations covering 3,150 women. The mean number of
observations per man is 11.2, while per woman is 8.3. The first two waves of the
sample were included: this results in a pool of people being married not before
1950 and not later than 1999. Since in 1999 some agents are not yet married, an
appropriate procedure was use to account for censoring.
Estimation of determinants of age at marriage requires setting up a statistical
model specifying a functional form for eq. (9). Since many possible distributional
specifications are available and the economic theory of marriage does not provide
any clear-cut hint about them, we chose to adopt the function which best fits the
sample. At first the unconditional hazard rate was plotted for men and women
and reported in fig. 5 (the corresponding survivor functions are plotted in fig.
6). These figures show strong concavity in hazard rates: even though this is not
unambiguous evidence of time-dependency of the hazard rate, it is likely that
4The data collection and maintenance procedure is lead by the Bicocca University in Milan.
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the largest fraction of marriages does happen during a well-defined time interval
which roughly corresponds to the fertile section of adult life, and this holds true
especially for women. A natural implication is that the hazard rate cannot be as-
sumed to be constant over time, so that the exponential specification must be put
aside. Next, we estimated the gender-based models over several competing dis-
tributional assumptions. Results are reported in tab. (3). Relying on the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Ludden,
Beal, and Sheiner, 1994; Koehler and Murphree, 1988), we find that the Gamma
distribution fits the data best. The corresponding χ2 values provide support for
the Weibull distribution for women, but the difference with Gamma distribution
is very limited. Thus, the choice for the parametrization to adopt is the Gamma
function: estimation results for this specification are displayed in the first and
third column of tab. (5).
One problem with parametric estimation is that a substantial interpretation
can rarely be given to the parameters which are intrinsic to the distribution func-
tion. Thus, an alternative way to frame the problem is to consider the baseline
hazard as a nuisance and estimate it through a semi-parametric approach which
does not rely on any distributional assumption. In our context, this procedure
was performed using the Cox estimator and results are displayed in the second
and fourth column of tab. (5).
Both for parametric and semi-parametric specifications, the standard errors
were estimated using a bootstrap technique with 50 replications stratified over
individuals. As regards the interpretation of the parameter sign, the two models
are estimated using different metrics. The Gamma model employs the Acceler-
ated Failure-Time (AFT) metric, while the Cox model employs the Log Relative-
Hazard (LRH) metric. For example, a positive estimated coefficient in the AFT
metric indicates longer durations for higher values of the covariate, while in the
LRH metric a positive coefficients indicates higher probability of a transition of
state for higher values of the covariate, which results in shorter durations. Ba-
sically, when contrasting the two models, the statistically significant coefficients
display opposite signs across the two models. With regard to interpretation of
estimated parameters in the Cox model, it is worth recalling that the baseline
hazard ψ(t) in eq. (7) is not parametrically estimated: hence, the only possible
interpretations about the hazard rate can be made for changes in independent
variables (Singer and Willett, 2003). A percentage variation in the hazard rate in
response to a variation in the exogenous variable Xj from x0 to x1 can be calcu-
lated as follows [
eβ j(Xj=x1) − eβ j(Xj=x0)
eβ j(Xj=x0)
]
· 100. (10)
which in the case of a dummy variable reduces to [eβ j − 1] · 100.
5.2 Comments
Divorce Law. The estimated impact of the dummy variable on the marriage
hazard rate is largely positive, both for women and men, in the Cox and in the
Gamma specifications. This implies that individuals responded to the introduc-
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tion of divorce law by shortening their search spells. Compared to the no-divorce
scenario and other things being equal, marriage has become a riskier business
both for men and women. However, in our sample people seem to respond to this
change in the rules of the game by increasing their propensity to marry, which
is puzzling since an increase in risk should produce a decrease in the demand
for marriage. To solve this riddle, it is worth going back to the basic mechanics
of marriage. As was noted in the theoretical section, marriage is a multiperiod
contract, and a legal innovation introducing the possibility of breaking the con-
tract impacts both on married couples and individual agents who are considering
whether to marry. Following this legal change, married agents register a decrease
in their reservation utility: the marriages which dissolve are those in which at
least one partner prefers divorce to staying with the current partner. This ex-
plains why during the years immediately following the introduction of divorce
the number of divorces rocketed, as it is clear from fig.3. This was a temporary ef-
fect due to the adjustment of the previous stock of marginal couples. Most likely,
this legal innovation also changed the equilibrium within inframarginal couples,
i.e. those who adjust to the new legislation but decide not to break; however, we
do not investigate the issue in this article, since our focus is on single individuals
who are considering whether to marry.
The impact of regime change on prospective marriages is twofold: on the one
hand, since marriage implies idiosyncratic investments, the possibility of uni-
lateral divorce makes the contract riskier. Consequently, risk-adverse partners
should become more cautious when considering the option of marriage. Some
of these people may decide not to marry at all, while others may become more
selective. As a result, the average length of search spell registers an increase.
Moreover, should the marriage prove unsatisfactory, each partner is given by the
law the possibility to break it – bearing a fraction of its cost – and possibly starting
another marriage anew. In the search process, this innovation pushes individu-
als to become less picky since divorce is a way out from a bad marriage: the
outcome would be a decrease in the average length of search spell. Economic
theory of marriage has no clear prediction on the net effect of these two contrast-
ing forces. Our estimation results suggest that, on balance, what prevails between
these two opposing forces is the increased utility deriving from the availability of the new
exit option.
An alternative way to model this balance of forces, although it is not very com-
mon in marriage economics literature, consists in framing the decision to marry in
the context of modern investment theory.5 While traditional theory investigates
the binary choice between investing and not investing, the most recent theory
based on option value stresses the role played by irreversible actions and fixed
costs. Since the first marriage entails a permanent change in personal status, peo-
ple can choose rationally when to exercise the option of marrying. A basic result
of option value theory says that the more irreversible an investment, the longer
will be the period spent waiting to use the related option. In our model, a mar-
5In fact, the best book to date on the subject (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), calls for an extensive use
of option value concept in the economic theory of the family. This suggestion does not seem to be
taken into account by family economists, apart from the recent remarkable exception of Strobel
(2003).
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riage which does not include the possibility of divorce is more irreversible than
a marriage in which individuals can divorce unilaterally when individual utility
falls below a given threshold. Hence, the change in divorce legislation promotes
shorter search spells. Our evidence suggests that Italian couples respond to in-
centives related to irreversibility and decreased waiting time. In terms of the tra-
ditional theory of marriage, our data show individuals put a heavier weight on
the possibility of escaping a bad marriage rather than on the security of a life-long
marriage.
From estimation results it is evident that women reacted more than men to the
change in legislation. A possible explanation for this result is that women on av-
erage are more constrained than men in their search for matching partners, given
that their biological clock related to fertility ticks faster than men’s. A lower level
of irreversibility, from a woman’s standpoint, could be valued more positively
than from a man’s perspective since it lowers the penalty related to a bad match.
Consequently, women should discount less than men the possibility of marriage
break-up and their search strategy is more affected by the exit option than men’s.
To control for the confounding effect of the time trend on the dummy vari-
able for divorce, year at observation was inserted to account for aggregate trend
which reflects unobservable changes. The estimated values show decreasing age
at marriage before 1971, with a strong structural break occurring at 1971, and then
an almost flat tendency.
Educational Attainment and Job Status. Being enrolled in the educational sys-
tem increases the length of search spell. Using the Cox estimates to derive quan-
titative predictions, a man who is studying faces a hazard rate that is -53.2%
lower than the hazard rate faced by a man who is not studying. For women,
the decrease in the hazard ratio following enrollment in the educational system
is -64.2%. In general, better education brings improvements both in household
and market productivity, along with immaterial benefits which impact positively
on child rearing, but these benefits come at the cost of delaying the marriage and
reducing the expected number of children. Estimation shows that the delaying
effect is stronger for women. What is the rationale for this finding? Since edu-
cation is also an intermediate good in the production of family income, a lower
level of education can be traded against a better job position, for education and
job are partially substitutable in the production of family income and welfare.
Probably, men can trade education against labor and remain in a strong com-
petitive position in the marriage market, while women have a weaker degree of
substitutability. This is partly due to higher levels of the unemployment rate for
women and to the higher reservation wages that women demand to enter the la-
bor market: for them, demand for education must be higher if they want to form
good matches in the marriage market. The estimation reveals the presence of a
trade-off between accumulating additional human capital and waiting for a bet-
ter partner on the one hand, and accumulating less human capital and marrying
earlier on the other. This trade-off proves more binding for women than for men
since men are less constrained by labor and marriage markets conditions. Af-
ter the introduction of divorce, the impact of education remains stable for men,
while it changes for women: now, this value becomes -100.0%, which implies
that studying becomes more difficult to reconcile with marriage and that, once
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in the educational system, women become less prone to marry since this could
lead to study interruption or canceling. This reflects that, after divorce, education
becomes more valuable for women than for men.
Differential education also plays a role in determining age at marriage, but
this is reflected in an increase in age at marriage. A man endowed with educa-
tion which is 10% higher than the reference pool of marriageable men, faces a
-80.9% decrease in his hazard rate, while women face -75.5% decrease. This sur-
prisingly small gender difference is probably attributable to the effect that extra
education plays in the marriage market for women. Most probably, these agents
face larger difficulties compared to agents with negative differential education,
since the former tend to match with similar types which are quite rare in the
marriage market, so their search becomes longer. After the divorce reform took
place, the negative effect of differential education became stronger both for men
and women: the same increase of 10% in differential education for women results
in a chance in the hazard rate of -99.2%. Since differential education is mainly a
positional good, this variation across time may reflect the higher level of average
education among women and a decreased dispersion around the mean.
Job status displays strong asymmetric effects on sexes. The effect of changing
job status from unemployment to a stable job increases men’s age at marriage by
48.4%, while for women the change is -46.0%: the two values are virtually the
opposite of one another. An enhancement in job status has a positive impact on
the probability of marriage for men and tends to decrease their search spell; on
the contrary, a positive variation in the same variable makes marriage less likely
for women and delays it. Men with better positions in the job market can afford
marriage more easily, since they are able to support a family on a stable basis, and
prospective partners of the opposite sex attach value to this asset. These results
provide evidence that unemployment or job instability make men less likely to
marry. On the contrary, women who are stronger in the job market probably
face greater difficulties in marrying since home production and child rearing can
be matched with working outside the house only at a substantial cost. Thus, we
have a substitution effect on marriage probability: a more stable job implies lower
gains from trade and a decreased propensity to marry for women. Furthermore,
when traditional gender roles prevail, the same men have higher gains from trade
in marriage, so they are likely to marry for they lose much from being single. This
finding corroborates Becker’s result that high income should create incentives
for men not to marry late (Becker, 1991). From estimation results, the change in
legislation impacted the role played by job position in determining the hazard
rate. The transition from unemployment to a stable job now results in a 117.2%
increase for men, while it results in a -39.7% decrease for women. This shows a
11.8% decrease in the penalty attached to stable job. As expected, this last result
confirms that after divorce reform, the marriage market for women adjusted to
the new strategic role of job status.
Religious Attendance. From estimation results religious attendance does not
play any significant role in explaining male probability of marriage, while it ex-
erts a small negative effect on women’s probability of marital transition. Con-
sidering a change in participation in church celebrations from none to more than
once a week, the corresponding decrease in the hazard rate is -11.8%. This result
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is consistent with previous literature showing that high levels of service atten-
dance and religious involvement for Catholics tend to delay marriage because
of the high perceived irreversibility. More interestingly, the impact of religious
attendance when divorce is allowed by national law (but not by Catholic law) is
reversed: it becomes positive, with a value around 21.2%. This reversed trend
may result from the new emphasis given by the Catholic Church to traditional
family after 1971, combined with increased strong prohibitions of pre-marital sex
and abortions, which drove young Catholic women towards earlier marriages.
Family Background and Other Controls. According to the estimation results, the
role played by family background on the search spell is of mild importance. For
men it is significant only after 1971, while for women the value remains the same
across the whole sample and the magnitudes of the effects are basically constant
across genders. Since parents’ education is positively related to the factor, and
given that the estimated parameter in the Cox model is negative, an increase in
parental education decreases the likelihood of marriage. In general, more edu-
cated parents place a high value on the education of their children and tend to
create wealthier families and emotionally comfortable environments, thereby in-
creasing the reservation value of leaving the parental nest. In addition, the larger
the family, the more traditional the gender expectations will be for the offspring:
young women are required to help their parents and siblings, while men are re-
quired to find a job and leave the parents’ house. Furthermore, all other variables
held constant, larger families usually display lower levels of average consump-
tion, a factor which is likely to work against long spells of singlehood.
Another control was geographical location, since systematic differences in the
economic and social performance of southern and northern Italian regions are
commonly observed (Barbagli, Castiglioni, and Dalla Zuanna, 2003; Schizzerotto,
2002; Barbagli and Saraceno, 1997). The dummy control variable for geographical
location interacted with the divorce law provides weak evidence that residence in
the South tends to decrease women’s search spell by a value close to 4.2%, while
for men the percentage change is around 24.9%, although the p-values suggest
significance just for a limited fraction of the sample.
The last control introduced in the regression models is a dummy variable for
a child born before marriage. The main effect is on men, both before and after
the divorce law. Before the divorce law, a child born increases the hazard ratio
by 67.4%; after the divorce law, this value decreases to 10.2%. From our sample,
women seem to be affected by out-of-wedlock births in a very limited way.
Year at observation was inserted to take account of aggregate trends which
reflect unobservable changes. The estimated values show decreasing age at mar-
riage before 1971, with a strong structural break occurring in 1971, and then an
almost flat tendency.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper the effect of the introduction of divorce on marriage was investi-
gated using a retrospective Italian data survey. Since Italy is one the countries
which introduced such a major social innovation in a not-so-far past, these data
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provide an interesting fount of natural experiment.
In the theoretical section, the underlying microeconomic model is based on the
assumption that agents sample sequentially from a given distribution of available
mates and choose optimally whether to accept a marriage offer, given their en-
dowment of specific personal traits. Some of these traits are exogenously given,
such as the family background or current conditions in the marriage market,
while others are a matter of choice, such as investment in education or the level
of involvement in the labor market. When divorce is not permitted by law, the
decision to marry is irreversible, while the introduction of divorce introduces the
possibility of serial marriages. This innovation creates incentives to change search
behavior since marital investment becomes riskier, but divorce is also an exit op-
tion.
In the empirical section, we tested the effect of the new divorce legislation on
the probability of marriage. The dummy variable for the introduction of divorce
was inserted into the complete sample, whereas the same dummy was interacted
with other variables which are a matter of choice. Other variables at the personal
and at the environmental levels were included to control for confounding effects.
Results show that the very introduction of divorce reduced the average search
spell, since availability of a new exit option makes the decision to marry less irre-
versible than it was in the past. This interpretation is consistent with the option
value theory of investment.
An important lesson from these results is the asymmetric behavior of men
and women approaching the age at marriage. Most probably, women who plan
to have children tend to put a heavier weight on offspring welfare compared to
men, so they invest less in their own human capital and more in marriage-specific
capital: as a consequence, the introduction of divorce affects their marginal choice
between marrying or otherwise. This change in evaluation does not necessarily
imply that women are penalized by divorce: in a recent article, Stevenson and
Wolfers (2006) provide evidence that a shift from consensual to no-fault divorce
legislation had a positive impact on women’s welfare in the US, since the threat
of divorce is capable of lowering domestic violence, female suicide, and distress.
The point of this paper is different, since it emphasizes the search behavior
that precedes marriage: even though a bad marriage is easier to interrupt for
women, when men tend to search less for a good match, the quality of marriage
obviously could decline, and both spouses may be affected. It is documented
(Stevenson, 2003) that more liberal divorce laws decrease the level of investment
in marriage-specific assets, like spouse’s education, children, and household spe-
cialization: this can result in weaker family links that make divorce more likely.
In this perspective, the positive trend of divorce could be due more to men’s dis-
satisfaction than women’s. True, a change the introduction of divorce changes
the balance of power in a marriage, giving more leverage to the weaker or more
vulnerable spouse, but rational agents tend to adjust their pre-marital behavior
to these new rules (Gruber, 2004). Any innovation comes at a cost: divorce is no
exception.
19
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Results
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Enrolled in School/University 0.19 (0.39) 0 1 78259
Differential Education 0 (0.45) -1.52 2.55 78259
Occupational Status 1.75 (1.45) 0 3 78259
Family Background Factor -0.05 (1.36) -6.24 5.72 78259
Religious Attendance 3.45 (2.03) 1 7 78259
Child Born Before Marriage 0.01 (0.12) 0 1 78259
Resident in the South 0.4 (0.49) 0 1 78259
Year at observation 1970.99 (14.55) 1926 1999 78259
After Divorce Law 0.51 (0.5) 0 1 78259
Table 2: Before-And-After Statistics.
Men Women
Before After ∆ Before After ∆
Mean Age at Marriage 28.82 27.70 -1.12 25.45 25.12 -0.33
Median Age at Marriage 28.00 28.00 - 24.00 25.00 +1.00
Years of Completed Education 6.75 10.12 +3.37 5.68 10.33 +4.65
Occupational Status 2.11 1.81 -0.30 1.33 1.39 +0.06
Religious Attendance 3.47 2.88 -0.59 4.34 3.34 -1.00
Child Born Before Marriage 0.00 0.01 +0.01 0.01 0.02 +0.01
Father’s Education 4.65 6.78 +2.13 4.94 7.04 +2.10
Mother’s Education 4.02 6.05 +2.03 4.22 6.16 +1.94
Family Dimension at 14 5.18 4.08 -1.10 5.25 4.12 -1.13
House Owned by Back Family 0.43 0.47 +0.04 0.42 0.48 +0.06
Unemployment Rate - Men 2.76 4.88 +2.12 2.75 4.88 +2.13
Unemployment Rate - Women 4.17 10.33 +6.16 4.21 10.32 +6.11
Table 3: Comparison between competing distributional specifications.
Model LL(null) LL(model) df AIC BIC χ2
Men Weibull -27.02 436.70 13 -847.40 -733.60 603.05
Gamma 940.94 1,271.11 13 -2,516.21 -2,402.41 587.37
Log-Normal 740.84 1,098.06 12 -2,172.11 -2,067.07 601.75
Log-Logistic 847.58 1,232.27 12 -2,440.55 -2,335.50 628.03
Exponential -4,022.50 -1,723.33 11 3,468.65 3,564.94 3,675.97
Gompertz -650.58 -21.98 12 67.97 173.01 853.62
Women Weibull -645.28 185.66 12 -347.31 -245.11 865.90
Gamma 652.52 1,146.19 13 -2,266.37 -2,155.65 877.72
Log-Normal 280.67 920.65 12 -1,817.30 -1,715.10 1,048.62
Log-Logistic 407.29 1,054.85 12 -2,085.71 -1,983.50 1,094.12
Exponential -4,326.91 -2,798.70 11 5,619.39 5,713.08 2,402.22
Gompertz -1,461.64 -530.44 12 1,084.89 1,187.09 882.66
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Table 4: Principal Component Analysis of Family Background
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5
Father’s Education 0.609 0.346 -0.067 0.102 -0.704
Mother’s Education 0.615 0.328 -0.061 0.074 0.710
House Owned by Back Family -0.049 0.271 0.961 0.002 -0.000
Family Dimension at 14 -0.407 0.514 -0.168 0.736 0.024
Only Child 0.288 -0.660 0.200 0.665 0.003
Table 5: Duration Data
Men Women
Gamma Cox Gamma Cox
Explanatory Variables β p β p β p β p
Enrolled in School/University 0.078 (0.01) -0.759 (0.00) 0.104 (0.00) -1.028 (0.00)
Differential Education 0.041 (0.00) -0.166 (0.01) 0.032 (0.00) -0.141 (0.00)
Occupational Status -0.017 (0.00) 0.132 (0.00) 0.033 (0.00) -0.206 (0.00)
Family Background Factor 0.007 (0.05) -0.017 (0.41) 0.011 (0.00) -0.060 (0.01)
Religious Attendance 0.005 (0.03) -0.011 (0.36) 0.004 (0.06) -0.021 (0.04)
Child Born Before Marriage -0.153 (0.05) 0.515 (0.01) -0.012 (0.81) -0.082 (0.63)
Resident in the South -0.024 (0.00) 0.050 (0.32) 0.018 (0.03) -0.066 (0.25)
Year at observation -0.015 (0.00) 0.102 (0.00) -0.016 (0.00) 0.108 (0.00)
Enrolled in School/University * DL -0.042 (0.19) 0.153 (0.55) 0.023 (0.22) -0.405 (0.07)
Differential Education * DL 0.033 (0.02) -0.221 (0.06) 0.063 (0.00) -0.336 (0.00)
Occupational Status * DL -0.004 (0.37) 0.127 (0.00) -0.006 (0.11) 0.037 (0.09)
Family Background Factor * DL 0.009 (0.09) -0.080 (0.01) -0.002 (0.70) 0.014 (0.63)
Religious Attendance * DL -0.003 (0.40) 0.012 (0.52) -0.005 (0.06) 0.053 (0.00)
Child Born Before Marriage * DL 0.059 (0.50) -0.418 (0.09) 0.032 (0.59) -0.282 (0.21)
Resident in the South * DL 0.003 (0.81) 0.172 (0.05) -0.024 (0.03) 0.108 (0.13)
Year at observation * DL 0.019 (0.00) -0.116 (0.00) 0.022 (0.00) -0.132 (0.00)
After Divorce Law -37.438 (0.00) 227.169 (0.00) -43.521 (0.00) 259.610 (0.00)
Constant 32.922 (0.00) 34.300 (0.00)
κ -1.913 (0.00) -1.865 (0.00)
σ -0.276 (0.00) -0.446 (0.00)
χ2 932 1,497 1,422 2,912
Total observations 29,888 29,888 26,046 26,046
Subjects 2,664 2,664 3,150 3,150
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